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I. Introduction	  
Playing	  a	  game	  of	  squash,	  my	  opponent	  hits	  a	  drop	  shot	  to	  the	  left	  corner.	  	  I	  run	  to	  the	  
front	  of	  the	  court	  –	  I	  do	  not	  bump	  into	  him	  or	  the	  walls	  as	  I	  do.	  	  Then,	  seeing	  that	  the	  
ball	  has	  bounced	  high,	  I	  step	  out	  on	  my	  right	  foot,	  and	  hit	  the	  ball	  high	  on	  the	  front	  wall	  
for	   a	   cross-­‐court	   lob.	   	   What	   kind	   of	   visual	   information	   allows	   me	   to	   plan	   and	   then	  
execute	   this	   complex	  act	  of	   coordination?	   	   I	   do	  not	  mean	   this	   as	   a	  neuroscientific,	   or	  
even	  a	  psychological,	  question,	  but	  as	  one	  in	  philosophy,	  and	  though	  I	  hope	  that	  what	  I	  
say	  will	  be	  scientifically	  sound,	  I	  shall	  be	  as	  empirically	  non-­‐specific	  as	  I	  can.	  	  	  
The	  question	  can	  be	  posed	  in	  an	  old-­‐fashioned	  framework.	  	  There	  is	  a	  process	  of	  
practical	  reasoning	  that	  leads	  up	  to	  my	  action.	  	  Minimally:	  
1. I	  want	  to	  strike	  the	  ball.	  
2. The	  ball	  is	  there.	  
3. So:	  I	  must	  run	  there	  .	  .	  .	  etc.	  
The	   question	   is:	   What	   premises	   deriving	   from	   visual	   content	   must	   figure	   in	   such	   a	  
process?1	   	  How	  do	  the	  various	  terms	   in	  the	  above	  relate	  to	  what	  we	   immediately	  and	  
non-­‐inferentially	  see?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Matthen	  1988	  and	  Burge	  2005	  for	  treatments	  (from	  somewhat	  different	  perspectives)	  of	  questions	  
like	   this.	   	   Both	   papers	   emphasize	   how	   the	   assignment	   of	   intentional	   content	   to	   visual	   states	   facilitates	  
accounts	  of	  visual	  data-­‐processing	  given	  by	  cognitive	  science.	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In	  this	  paper,	  I	  distinguish	  three	  sorts	  of	  idea	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  visually	  guiding	  
action.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  sketch	  an	  account	  of	  how	  these	  ideas	  –	  two	  types	  of	  visual	  idea	  and	  
one	  non-­‐visual	  (as	  I	  shall	  argue)	  –	  interact	  in	  visually	  guided	  action.	  
II. Three	  Ideas	  of	  the	  Target	  	  
For	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   consider	   just	   the	   ball.	   	   How	   is	   it	   represented	   in	   the	   above	  
process	  of	  reasoning?	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  must	  have	  a	  game-­‐related	  idea	  of	  the	  ball	  –	  an	  idea	  that	  gives	  it	  a	  place	  
in	  the	  rules	  and	  tactics	  of	  a	  squash	  game	  –	  for	  this	  governs	  the	  formation	  of	  intentions	  
such	  as	  striking	  it,	  doing	  so	  before	  it	  bounces	  twice,	  making	  it	  hit	  the	  front	  wall	  between	  
the	   tin	   and	   the	   top	   line,	   making	   it	   difficult	   for	   my	   opponent	   to	   strike	   it,	   and	   so	   on.	  	  
Speaking	  more	  generally,	  even	  when	  one	  is	  speaking	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  visual	  data	  to	  
behaviour,	  one	  needs	   to	  bring	   in	  non-­‐visual	   ideas	  of	   the	  objects	   involved.	   	  For	  when	   I	  
form	   the	   intention	   to	   act	   upon	   an	   object,	   I	   do	   so	   under	   an	   idea	   that	   fits	   it	   into	   my	  
broader	   aims.	   	   These	   broader	   aims	   are	   rarely	   confined	   to	   evincing	   behaviour	   that	  
satisfies	  certain	  physical	  parameters	  –	  running	  in	  a	  certain	  direction	  at	  a	  certain	  speed,	  
hitting	  the	  ball	  with	  a	  certain	  force	  at	  a	  certain	  angle,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  What	  I	  want	  to	  achieve	  
is	  usually	   comprehensible	  only	   in	   some	  behaviour-­‐transcending	   framework.	   	   I	  want	   to	  
win	  a	  point,	  neutralize	  the	  opponent’s	  advantage	  in	  court-­‐position,	  trap	  him	  against	  the	  
back	  wall,	   and	   so	  on.	   	   These	  aims	  have	   to	  be	  achieved	  by	  my	  bodily	  movements,	  but	  
they	   go	   beyond	   these	  movements.	   	  Moreover,	   my	   target	   cannot	   be	   specified	   just	   in	  
visual	   terms.	   	   I	   aim	   to	  strike	   that	   small	  black	   sphere,	  but	  only	  because	   it	   is	   the	  ball	   in	  
play.	   	   It	   is	  because	   the	  visual	   specification	   is	   identified	  with	  specification	  of	   the	   target	  
under	  the	  governing	  idea	  that	  my	  physical	  behaviour	  is	  launched.	  	  	  
This	   is	   true	   even	   of	   animals	   incapable	   of	   explicit	   reasoning.	   	   Consider	   a	   dog	  
chasing	   a	   ball	   thrown	  by	   its	   owner.	   	   The	   dog	   is	   retrieving	   for	   its	   owner.	   	   If	   its	   owner	  
threw	  a	  Frisbee,	  the	  dog	  would	  chase	  after	  it;	  if	  some	  other	  person	  nearby	  threw	  a	  ball,	  
her	  dog	  would	  not	  chase	  it	  (or	  can	  be	  trained	  not	  to).	  	  In	  this	  case	  too,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  
dog’s	  visual	  information	  is	  assimilated	  to	  its	  broader	  aims	  that	  its	  physical	  behaviour	  is	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launched.	  	  Because	  the	  point	  extends	  in	  this	  way	  to	  animal	  actions,	  it	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  
situations	  in	  which	  highly	  acculturated	  terms	  are	  in	  play	  –	  as	  they	  are	  in	  my	  example	  of	  
the	   squash	   game.	   	   Target-­‐oriented	   behaviour,	   we	   might	   say,	   presupposes	   a	   mental	  
representation	  of	  the	  target	  under	  which	  action	  on	  that	  target	   is	  chosen.	   	  This	  mental	  
representation	  transcends	  behaviour	  understood	  in	  purely	  physical	  terms.	  	  	  	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  squash	  ball,	  then,	   let	  us	  label	  the	  behaviour-­‐transcending	  idea	  
of	  it	  –	  the	  idea	  relevant	  to	  my	  squash	  game-­‐related	  intentions	  –	  [BI].	  	  (When	  I	  mean	  to	  
be	  talking	  about	  the	  idea,	  I	  shall	  put	  square	  brackets	  around	  BI;	  without	  these	  brackets,	  
the	  symbol	  denotes	  the	  ball.)	  
2.	   	   In	  order	  to	  translate	  my	  game-­‐related	  intentions	   into	  physical	  behaviour,	   I	  must	  be	  
able	  visually	  to	   identify	  the	  ball.	   	  Having	  forming	  specific	   intentions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
ball	  under	  the	  idea	  [BI],	  I	  need	  to	  know	  which	  object	  in	  my	  vicinity	  falls	  under	  this	  idea,	  
track	   where	   it	   is,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   Thus,	   I	   might	   engage	   in	   an	   implicit	   mental	   process	  
something	  like	  the	  following:	  
I	  want	  to	  strike	  BI.	  
BI	  =	  the	  thing	  that	  looks	  like	  so.	  
So,	  I	  want	  to	  strike	  the	  thing	  that	  looks	  like	  so.	  	  
Let	  us	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  visual	  idea,	  or	  image,	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  phrase	  “the	  thing	  
that	   looks	   like	   so”	  above.	   	  Call	   it	   [BV].	   	   In	  order	   to	  know	  where	   to	  direct	  my	   intended	  
behaviour,	  I	  must	  visually	  search	  for	  and	  act	  on	  something	  that	  satisfies	  [BV].	  
3.	  	  Lastly,	  since	  physical	  action	  is	  in	  question,	  I	  must	  possess	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  
control	  my	  body	  relative	  to	  the	  ball.	  	  For	  this,	  I	  must	  be	  able	  to	  locate	  and	  track	  the	  ball	  
in	  “egocentric	  space”	  –	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  real	  space,	  measured	  in	  a	  coordinate	  system	  in	  
which	   some	   point	   on	   my	   body	   is	   at	   the	   origin,	   <0,	   0,	   0>E.	   	   	   (The	   subscript	   marks	  
egocentric	   coordinates;	   action-­‐relevant	   representation	   of	   position	   is	   in	   polar	  
coordinates,	  so	  that	  the	  first	  coordinate	  represents	  the	  target’s	  distance,	  the	  second	  its	  
azimuth	   relative	   to	   some	   body-­‐defined	   direction,	   and	   the	   third	   its	   elevation.)	   	   At	   a	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certain	   point	   I	   must	   move	   my	   feet	   in	   such	   and	   such	   a	   direction.	   	   As	   I	   conduct	   my	  
sequence	  of	  actions,	  I	  update	  the	  position	  of	  targets	  relative	  to	  me.	  	  	  
Identifying	   the	   ball	   visually	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   me	   to	   complete	   my	   intended	  
course	  of	  behaviour.	   	  Targeted	  bodily	  movement	  requires	  me,	  or	  my	  visual	  system,	  to	  
compute	   the	   position	   of	   the	   ball	   and	   other	   objects	   relative	   to	   my	   body,	   i.e.,	   in	  
egocentric	  space.	  	  Once	  I	  have	  done	  this,	  I	  can	  engage	  in	  the	  following	  reasoning:	  
I	  want	  to	  strike	  BV.	  
BV	  =	  the	  material	  object	  at	  <r,	  θ,	  ϕ>E.	  
So	  I	  want	  to	  strike	  the	  material	  object	  at	  <r,	  θ,	  ϕ>E.	  
The	   upshot	   of	   these	   considerations	   is	   that	   I	   will	   have	   an	   egocentric	   location	  
representation	  for	  the	  ball.	  	  Call	  this	  [BE]	  –	  let	  it	  stand	  in	  for	  “	  the	  material	  object	  at	  <r,	  θ,	  
ϕ>E”	  above.	   	  My	  bodily-­‐movement	  schema	  at	  any	  given	  point	  of	  time	  will	  make	  use	  of	  
[BE]	  .	  
Empiricist	  orthodoxy	  maintains	  that	  the	  ball’s	  egocentric	  coordinates	  are	  given	  in	  
visual	   consciousness	   –	   for,	   according	   to	   a	   philosopher	   like	   Hume,	   the	   “visual	   field”	   is	  
egocentric.	   	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  mistake.	   	  My	  conscious	  visual	   image	  of	  the	  ball	  and	  its	  
trajectory	   is	   court-­‐centred,	   not	   self-­‐centred.	   	   I	   am	   not	   consciously	   aware	   of	   its	  
egocentric	  trajectory	  –	  for	  instance,	  it	  does	  not	  present	  the	  appearance	  of	  moving	  faster	  
in	  my	   direction	   as	   I	   accelerate	   toward	   it,	   though	   in	   egocentric	   terms,	   of	   course,	   it	   is	  
moving	   faster.	   	   I	  am	  aware	  of	   its	   speed	  and	  my	  speed	  relative	   to	   the	  court.	   	   I	  am	  not	  
conscious	  of	  [BE],	  it	  seems	  –	  at	  least	  not	  fully.	  	  	  
Hume	   was	   wrong,	   then,	   about	   the	   egocentricity	   of	   conscious	   visual	  
representations;	   nevertheless,	   animals	   perform	   their	   tasks	   in	   ways	   that	   indicate	   that	  
their	   movements	   are	   controlled	   egocentrically.	   	   As	   R.	   S.	   Woodworth	   (1899)	  
demonstrated	   in	   a	   remarkable	   Ph.D.	   thesis,	   human	   voluntary	   movements	   are	  
astonishingly	  accurate.	  	  For	  example,	  he	  observed	  some	  labourers	  pounding	  spikes	  with	  
a	  sledgehammer	  for	  an	  hour.	   	  He	  estimated	  that	  the	  arc	  of	  their	  swing	  was	  about	  150	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cm;	   yet	   their	   2	   cm	   wide	   target	   was	   missed	   only	   once	   in	   an	   estimated	   total	   of	   4000	  
swings	  among	  them	  all.	  	  For	  accuracy	  of	  this	  magnitude,	  he	  figured,	  the	  mean	  variance	  
of	   the	   point	   of	   impact	   would	   be	   much	   less	   than	   1	   cm.	   	   Similarly,	   when	   we	   rapidly	  
handwrite	  a	   row	  of	   letters,	   the	  corresponding	  points	  of	   the	   letters	  –	   for	   instance,	   the	  
top	  and	  middle	  points	  of	  the	  ‘b’	  and	  of	  the	  ‘h’,	  and	  the	  tails	  of	  the	  ‘g’	  and	  ‘y’	  –	  vary	  in	  
height,	   Woodworth	   estimates,	   by	   less	   than	   5%.	   	   This	   sort	   of	   accuracy	   in	   real	   time	  
demands	  not	  only	  that	  vision	  should	  determine	  the	  position	  of	  the	  target,	  but	  also	  that	  
it	   should	  provide	   this	   information	   to	   the	  efferent	   systems	   in	   the	  egocentric	   form	   that	  
they	  require.	   	  Transforming	  allocentrically	  coded	  conscious	  vision	   into	  egocentric	   form	  
would	  be	  far	  too	  slow.	  	  [BE]	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  computed	  independently.	  	  I’ll	  return	  to	  
this	  point	  in	  section	  IV,	  below.	  
III. Properly	  Visual	  Ideas	  
Before	  I	  can	  get	  to	  the	  main	  problem	  of	  describing	  the	  interaction	  among	  these	  ideas,	  I’ll	  
need	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  preliminary	  question.	  	  Are	  the	  three	  ideas	  that	  I	  have	  posited	  really	  
independent	   of	   one	   another,	   or	   are	   they	   simply	   three	   aspects	   or	   parts	   of	   a	   unified	  
conscious	  presentation?2	  
First,	  I’ll	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  [BI]	  is	  different	  from	  [BV].	  
Earlier,	  I	  argued	  that	  [BI]	  –	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ball	  that	  shows	  the	  point	  of	  the	  action	  
undertaken	   –	   is	   not,	   as	   such,	   a	   visual	   idea.	   	   (Here,	   I	   am	   speaking	   generally:	   visual	  
recognition	   tasks	  and	   the	   like	  might	  be	  couched	   in	  visual	   terms.)	   	  The	  ball	   is	  acted	  on	  
under	  squash-­‐tactical	  maxims	  of	  action.	  	  But	  I	  need	  visually	  to	  identify	  the	  ball	  in	  order	  
to	  put	  game-­‐related	  intentions	  into	  effect.	  	  And	  even	  when	  [BV]	  is	  on-­‐line	  and	  governing	  
my	  actions,	  the	  non-­‐visual	  idea	  [BI]	  still	  figures	  in	  my	  process	  of	  reasoning.	  	  For	  suppose	  
that	  while	  I	  am	  rushing	  to	  the	  ball,	  I	  notice	  that	  my	  opponent	  has	  retreated	  to	  the	  back	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  David	  Milner	  and	  Melvyn	  Goodale	  1995,	  chapter	  1,	  Andy	  Clark	  2000,	  Scott	  Glover	  2004,	  Goodale	  and	  
Milner	   2004a	   and	   b,	   and	  Mohan	  Matthen	   2005,	   chapter	   13,	   for	   background	  discussion	   relevant	   to	   the	  
next	  two	  sections.	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of	   the	  court.	   	  Then,	   I	  might	  change	  my	  plan.	   	   [BI]	   is	   in	  constant	   interaction	  with	  visual	  
ideas	  of	  the	  ball.	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  it	  seems	  that	  [BI]	  and	  [BV]	  are	  distinct	  
and	  independent.	  	  	  
Now,	  the	  distinction	  between	  visual	  and	  non-­‐visual	  ideas	  has	  come	  under	  attack.	  	  
The	  ordinary	   language	  verb	   ‘see’	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  purely	  visual	   ideas	  and	  
ideas	  that	  have	  a	  non-­‐visual	  component.	  	  I	  can	  say	  I	  see	  of	  something	  that	  it	  is	  blue	  and	  
with	  equal	  linguistic	  propriety	  I	  can	  say	  that	  I	  see	  of	  it	  that	  it	  is	  a	  five-­‐dollar	  bill.	  	  Yet,	  the	  
latter	  requires	  that	  I	  subsume	  what	  I	  see	  under	  a	  non-­‐visual	  concept,	  while	  the	  former	  is	  
a	  visual	  concept	  that	  comes	  pre-­‐packaged	  with	  the	  visual	  state.	  	  This	  distinction	  is	  elided	  
in	  many	  philosophical	  treatments	  of	  vision.	  	  The	  notion	  has	  become	  well	  entrenched	  in	  
some	   philosophical	   circles	   that	   there	   is	   no	   structural	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  
examples	   given	   above	   –	   that	   seeing	   something	   as	   F	   is	   always	   a	   matter	   of	   having	  
inarticulate	  visual	  sensations,	  which	  do	  not	  in,	  of,	  or	  by	  themselves	  present	  an	  object	  as	  
possessing	  any	  property.	  	  Thus,	  even	  seeing	  that	  something	  is	  blue	  is	  taken	  to	  require	  a	  
“view”	  or	  theory	  about	  blue	  things.	  	  (For	  a	  well-­‐presented	  recent	  version	  of	  this	  theory	  
see	  Anil	  Gupta	  2006.)	  	  	  	  	  
Though	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  argue	  the	  point	  in	  detail	  here,	  I	  regard	  this	  notion	  as	  
utterly	  mistaken.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  an	  inarticulate	  visual	  sensation	  –	  a	  
sensation	  is	  always	  a	  presentation	  of	  some	  object	  as	  possessing	  some	  sensory	  property,	  
and	   it	   is	   so	   in	   itself,	   not	   in	   virtue	   of	   other	   beliefs	   the	   perceiver	   holds.	   	   (See	  Matthen	  
2005,	   especially	   chapters	   1-­‐3.)	   	   We	   respond	   instinctively	   to	   sensations;	   contrary	   to	  
Gupta	  (2006)	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  form	  a	  “view”	  about	  what	  they	  mean.	  	  
Secondly,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  such	  cases	  as	  seeing	  a	  dollar	  bill,	  and	  not	  in	  such	  cases	  as	  
seeing	   something	   blue,	   that	   a	   further	   step	   of	   subsuming	   a	   visual	   sensation	   under	   a	  
learned	  or	   inferred	  non-­‐visual	  concept	   is	  required.	   	  For	  there	  are	  some	  properly	  visual	  
ideas,	   and	   seeing	   a	  V,	   where	  V	   is	   properly	   visual,	   is	   a	   direct	   visual	   apprehension,	   for	  
which	  a	  subject	  needs	  no	  theory.	  	  One	  simple	  way	  of	  making	  this	  point	  is	  the	  following,	  
modelled	   on	   a	  move	  made	   by	   Sydney	   Shoemaker’s	   (1968)	   and	  Gareth	   Evans’s	   (1982)	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discussion	  of	  “identification-­‐free”	  judgements	  (ibid	  179-­‐191).	  	  Suppose	  that	  you	  identify	  
a	  piece	  of	   paper	  poking	  out	  of	   somebody’s	  wallet	   as	   a	   five-­‐dollar	   bill.	   	   There	   are	   two	  
ways	  that	  your	  judgement	  can	  go	  wrong.	  	  First,	  you	  might	  be	  wrong	  about	  the	  colour	  of	  
a	  Canadian	  five-­‐dollar	  bill,	  and	  thus	  you	  may	  take	  a	  green-­‐looking	  banknote	  to	  be	  a	  five-­‐
dollar	  bill.	  	  Let’s	  call	  this	  an	  error	  of	  misconception.	  	  Second,	  the	  banknote	  may	  look	  blue	  
to	  you,	  and	  since	  you	  (correctly)	  think	  that	  all	  blue	  Canadian	  banknotes	  are	  five-­‐dollar	  
bills,	  you	  may	  take	  it	  to	  be	  a	  five-­‐dollar	  bill.	  	  You	  are	  wrong	  because	  it	  is	  actually	  green.	  	  
Let’s	   call	   this	  misperception.	   	   The	   point	   that	   I	   want	   to	   make	   is	   that	   with	   regard	   to	  
properly	  visual	   concepts,	  error	   through	  misconception	   is	   impossible.	   	  You	  can’t	  be	   led	  
into	  error	  by	  misconceiving	  blue	  –	  by	  mixing	  up	  the	  visual	  marks	  of	  blue	  with	  those	  of	  
green,	  for	  instance.	  	  This	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  properly	  visual	  idea.	  	  
Conclusion	  1	  [BV]	  consists	  of	   ideas	  that	  are	  immune	  to	  misconception	  by	  anybody	  who	  
can	  perceive	  them.	  	  [BI]	  contains	  ideas	  that	  are	  not	  immune	  to	  misconception.	  	  Thus,	  [BI]	  
≠	  [BV].	  
IV. Egocentric	  Visual	  Ideas	  
Now,	  I’ll	  explore	  the	  character	  of	  [BE]	  and	  show	  that	  it	  is	  independent	  of	  [BV].	  	  	  
Some	  hold	  that	  when	  you	  look	  at	  the	  squash	  ball	  you	  get	  an	  indivisible	  package	  
of	  visual	  information	  –	  that	  it	  is	  round,	  black,	  small,	  moving,	  and	  there.	  	  When	  you	  want	  
to	   act	   physically	   on	   something,	   the	   argument	   continues,	   you	   search	   for	   it	   under	   an	  
incomplete	  visual	  description	  –	  for	  instance,	  you	  might	  search	  for	  a	  black,	  round	  thing.	  	  
When	  you	  make	  visual	  contact	  with	  this	  thing,	  you	  (ideally)	  get	  a	  much	  fuller	  package	  of	  
visual	  information.	  	  This	  package	  includes	  its	  location	  relative	  to	  you.	  	  It	  is	  only	  by	  an	  act	  
of	  abstraction	  that	  you	  can	  separate	  location	  out	  as	  a	  distinct	  visual	  idea	  of	  the	  ball.	  	  [BE]	  
is	  an	  inextricable	  part	  of	  [BV].	  
The	   intuition	   that	   featural	   and	   locational	   information	   are	   inextricably	   linked	  
accords	  with	  a	  notion	  of	  eye-­‐hand	  coordination	  that	  some	  find	   intuitive.	   	  According	  to	  
this	  notion,	   vision	  provides	   an	   image,	  which	   the	   subject	  must	  use	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	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contact	  with	   external	   things.	   	   Think	   of	   a	   video	   game	   in	  which	   you	   simulate	   flying	   an	  
airplane.	  	  You	  work	  by	  monitoring	  a	  television	  image.	  	  This	  image	  is	  not	  used	  in	  a	  purely	  
egocentric	  fashion	  –	  when	  you	  shift	  about	  in	  your	  seat,	  the	  image	  shifts	  relative	  to	  you,	  
but	  this	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  your	  piloting.	  	  You	  act	  on	  your	  controls	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  
to	  make	  the	  image	  change	  in	  certain	  ways.	  	  When	  an	  object	  gets	  too	  close,	  for	  instance,	  
the	  imaged	  gap	  between	  the	  airplane	  and	  the	  object	  gets	  too	  small;	  you	  correct	  this	  by	  
acting	  on	  your	  joy-­‐stick	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  the	  gap	  grow	  bigger.	  	  When	  you	  want	  
to	  land	  the	  airplane,	  you	  manipulate	  the	  joy-­‐stick	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  as	  to	  make	  the	  axis	  
of	  the	  runway	  continue	  on	  from	  the	  axis	  of	  the	  airplane	  –	  the	  closer	  end	  touching	  the	  
nose	   –	   and	   then	   you	  make	   it	   get	   larger	   and	   larger	   while	  maintaining	   this	   alignment.	  	  
Similarly,	   it	  seems,	  a	  human	  subject	  in	  the	  real	  world	  can	  translate	  his	  movement-­‐plan	  
into	   an	   image-­‐manipulation	   plan.	   	   I	   catch	   a	   ball	   by	   first	   moving	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	  
stabilize	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ball-­‐image	  in	  my	  visual	  field,	  and	  then	  I	  catch	  it	  by	  reducing	  
the	   gap	  between	   the	   images	  of	   the	  ball	   and	  of	  my	  hand.	   	   The	   intuition	   is	   that	   bodily	  
movement	  is	  controlled	  indirectly	  by	  manipulating	  [BV].	  	  Let’s	  call	  this	  the	  Act-­‐by-­‐Image-­‐
Manipulation	  model,	  or	  AIM.	  	  AIM	  appears	  to	  eliminate	  the	  need	  for	  [BE].	  	  
The	   AIM	   model	   of	   visual	   guidance	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   developments	   in	   cognitive	  
neuroscience.	  	  There	  is	  now	  ample	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  no	  smoothly	  integrated	  visual	  
image	  of	  the	  sort	  envisaged	  in	  the	  intuitive	  picture	  of	  the	  control	  of	  action.	  	  In	  the	  last	  
few	   years,	   the	   debate	   around	   this	   proposition	   has	   revolved	   around	   the	   supposed	  
separation	   of	   two	   visual	   streams.	   One	   of	   these,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ventral	   stream,	   is	  
concerned	  with	   characteristics	   that	   objects	   possess	   independently	   of	   the	   illumination	  
and	   perspective	   in	  which	   they	  may	   stand	   at	   the	  moment	   of	   viewing	   –	   characteristics	  
such	   as	   colour,	   shape,	   surface	   texture,	   trajectory,	   allocentric	   position,	   etc.	   	   The	   other	  
visual	   stream,	   sometimes	   called	   the	   dorsal	   stream,	   is	   concerned	   with	   positional	  
information	   relevant	   to	   the	   selection	   and	   control	   of	   behaviour.	   	   The	   neurological	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component	  of	  the	  distinction	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  my	  concerns,	  and	  I	  will	  not	  rely	  on	  it	  here.3	  	  
What	   is	   just	   about	  uncontroversial	   is	   that	   visual	  processing	   for	  perceiver-­‐independent	  
object-­‐qualities	   –	   I’ll	   call	   this	  descriptive	   visual	   processing	   –	   is	   largely	   independent	   of	  
processing	   for	   egocentric	   position,	  which	   I	   shall	   call	  motion-­‐guiding	   visual	   processing.	  	  
My	  aim	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  [BV],	  which	  is	  furnished	  by	  descriptive	  vision,	  does	  not	  substitute	  
for	  [BE],	  which	  is	  furnished	  by	  motion-­‐guiding	  vision.	  	  Later,	  we’ll	  see	  how	  this	  carves	  out	  
a	  special	  semantic	  role	  for	  [BE].	  
Here	  is	  a	  thought-­‐experiment	  that	  brings	  out	  the	  independence	  of	  [BV]	  and	  	  [BE].	  	  
Think	  of	  two	  actions	  as	  follows.	  	  (A)	  Suppose	  that	  you	  are	  sitting	  in	  front	  of	  your	  desk,	  
looking	   at	   it.	   	   There	   are	   several	   objects	   on	   it.	   	   You	   pick	   up	   the	   pencil	   and	   write	  
something	  with	  it.	  	  Then,	  (B)	  you	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  desk,	  and	  recall	  a	  visual	  image	  of	  it.	  	  
This	  time,	  you	  select	  the	  eraser.	  	  You	  mime	  picking	  it	  up	  and	  erasing	  something.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  AIM	  model,	  both	  actions	  are	  guided	  by	  a	  visual	  image	  similar	  to	  
that	   which	   is	   generated	   by	   a	   sophisticated	   computer	   game	   –	   call	   this	   image	   [Desk-­‐
HandV]	  –	  though	  in	  the	  case	  of	  (B),	  this	  image	  might	  be	  somewhat	  degraded.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  
that	  in	  (A),	  you	  act	  on	  the	  pencil	  indirectly,	  by	  bringing	  about	  certain	  changes	  in	  [Desk-­‐
HandV].	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  reason	  why	  you	  cannot	  do	  the	  same	  in	  (B).	  	  	  Of	  course,	  
action	  (B)	  will	  not	  be	  as	  fluent	  and	  accurate	  as	  (A).	  	  Assuming	  that	  you	  haven’t	  practised	  
(B),	  in	  which	  case	  you	  will	  not	  be	  completely	  reliant	  on	  the	  image,	  you	  will	  not	  have	  the	  
same	  confidence;	  your	  reach	  will	  be	  more	  tentative;	   it	  may	  not	  be	   in	  exactly	   the	  right	  
direction	  or	  land	  at	  the	  right	  height;	  your	  grip	  may	  not	  be	  properly	  sized	  to	  the	  eraser.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   In	   Matthen	   (2005,	   chapter	   13),	   I	   made	   a	   function-­‐based	   distinction	   between	   descriptive	   vision	   and	  
motion-­‐guiding	   vision	   parallel	   to	   the	   seminal	   distinction	   between	   vision-­‐for-­‐perception	   and	   vision-­‐for-­‐
action	  made	  by	  Milner	  and	  Goodale	  (1995)	  and	  Goodale	  and	  Milner	   (2004a).	   	  The	  functional	  distinction	  
was	  meant	  to	  be	   independent	  of	  the	  ventral	  stream/dorsal	  stream	  distinction,	  also	  employed	  by	  Milner	  
and	  Goodale.	  	  The	  latter	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  neurological	  substrate	  of	  the	  former,	  but	  it	  is	  conceptually	  
distinct.	  	  This	  is	  not	  fully	  appreciated	  by	  some	  critics.	  	  Raftopoulos	  (2009)	  criticizes	  my	  distinction	  largely	  
on	  the	  grounds	  that	  ventral	  and	  dorsal	  stream	  processing	  are	  not	  independent	  of	  one	  another.	  	  But	  I	  do	  
not	  intend	  to	  make	  any	  claim	  about	  the	  anatomical	  loci	  of	  these	  visual	  functions.	  	  Raftopoulos	  agrees	  with	  
my	  claim	  that	  visual	  reference	  is	  determined	  independently	  of	  visual	  description	  (ibid.	  350),	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
claim	  I	  wish	  to	  elaborate	  here.	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Why?	  	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  recalled	  visual	  image	  is	  not	  as	  detailed	  
or	   accurate	   as	   an	   on-­‐line	   visual	   image:	   this	   partly	   accounts	   for	   inaccuracies	   in	   your	  
action.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  important	  deficiency	  in	  simulated	  action:	  the	  feedback	  that	  
you	   get	   from	   the	   recalled	   image	   does	   not	   translate	   as	   smoothly	   into	   action.	   	   This,	   I	  
believe,	  is	  important	  to	  understanding	  the	  failure	  to	  correct	  for	  inaccuracies	  in	  reaching,	  
and	  for	  the	  slowness	  and	  tentativeness	  of	  the	  simulated	  action.	  	  	  
There	   are	   three	   phases	   of	   a	   non-­‐simulated	   visually	   guided	   action	   such	   as	   (A).	  
First,	   you	   search	   for	   the	   pencil	   by	   its	   visual	   characteristics.	   	   This	   first	   phase	   is	   clearly	  
driven	  by	  descriptive	  vision.	   	  You	  use	  the	  generic	  pencil-­‐image	  that	  you	  have	  stored	  in	  
memory	   to	   select	   an	   object	   on	   your	   table	   by	   its	   visual	   characteristics.	   	   Next,	   your	  
knowledge	   of	   the	   object	   and	   your	   intention	   determines	   a	   motor-­‐schema	   –	   this	   will	  
include	   trajectory,	   speed,	   style	   of	   grip,	   and	   force.	   	   Finally,	   vision	   somehow	   helps	   you	  
translate	  the	  motor-­‐schema	  into	  physical	  behaviour.	  	  (As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  a	  moment,	  it	  is	  
not	  the	  only	  guidance	  unit	  operating	  here.)	  
Now,	   let’s	   consider	   the	   simulated	   action,	   (B).	   	   In	   its	   first	   phases,	   this	   action	   is	  
very	   similar.	   	   You	   will	   select	   the	   eraser	   from	   the	   several	   objects	   presented	   by	   your	  
recalled	   image,	   and	   select	   a	  motor-­‐scheme	   that	   depends	  on	   the	   action	   you	   intend	   to	  
mime.	   	   Then,	   you	   launch	   your	   hand	   toward	   the	   eraser	   based	   on	   its	   position	   in	   the	  
recalled	   image	   –	   presumably,	   this	   image	   is	   (or	   can	   be)	   arrayed	   in	   front	   of	   you	   in	   the	  
same	  manner	  as	  a	  sensory	  image.	  	  	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  motion	  phase	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  visual	  feedback	  seems	  most	  debilitating.	  	  
But	   why?	   	   You	   have	   an	   image	   of	   your	   desk	   in	   your	   mind’s	   eye.	   	   That	   mental	   image	  
presents	  the	  desk	  spread	  out	   in	  space.	   	  What	   is	  missing,	  relative	  to	  (A)?	   	   Is	   it	   that	  you	  
cannot	   see	   the	   position	   of	   your	   hand	   relative	   to	   the	   position	   of	   the	   eraser	   in	   your	  
mental	  image,	  and	  so	  cannot	  monitor	  the	  gap	  between	  hand	  and	  imagined	  eraser?	  	  But	  
why	   is	   this	   a	   shortcoming?	   	  After	   all,	   you	  possess	  bodily	   awareness	  of	   the	  position	  of	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your	  hand.	   	  And	   surely	   this	   is	   a	   large	  part	  of	   the	   guidance	  operating	   in	   (A).4	   	   For	   it	   is	  
exceedingly	   unlikely	   that	   in	   the	   sorts	   of	   cases	   described	   by	   Woodworth	   (1899)	   –	  
hammering	   a	   spike,	   writing	   a	   row	   of	   letters	   –	   visual	   feedback	   is	   the	   sole	   provider	   of	  
spatial	  information.	  	  Vision	  seems	  to	  provide	  the	  position	  of	  the	  spike	  or	  the	  paper,	  and	  
perhaps	  some	  of	  the	  last	  second	  course	  corrections,	  but	  it	  is	  bodily	  awareness	  that	  tells	  
you	  how	  the	  hammer	  and	  the	  pencil	  are	  going,	  and	  how	  much	  force	  is	  needed	  complete	  
the	   action.5	   	   The	   spatial	   awareness	   provided	   by	   vision	   and	   by	   bodily	   awareness	   are	  
integrated.	  	  So	  why	  not	  AIM	  in	  the	  integrated	  image?	  	  
My	   intuition	   is	   that	   AIM	   is	   actually	   a	   good	  model	   of	   how	  motor-­‐schemes	   are	  
executed	  when	  vision	  is	  off-­‐line.	  	  I	  would	  contend	  that	  the	  more	  fluid	  execution	  in	  case	  
(A)	  shows	  that	  a	  better	  method	  is	  at	  work	  there.	  	  On-­‐line	  vision	  guides	  the	  execution	  of	  
motor-­‐schemes	  by	  providing	  egocentric	  location	  information	  directly	  to	  the	  limbs.	  	  Off-­‐
line	  vision	   is	  unable	  to	  do	  this.	   	   In	  simulated	  action,	  we	  are	  therefore	  forced	  to	  AIM	  –	  
and	   since	   this	   method	   is	   indirect,	   it	   is	   slower	   and	   more	   inaccurate.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	  
distinction	   that	   is	   (perhaps)	   a	   bit	   crude	   and	   overstated.	   	   Descriptive	   visual	   content	  
contains	   a	   message	   about	   how	   things	   are	   in	   themselves,	   independently	   of	   the	  
observer’s	   perspective.	   	   This	   content	   can	  be	  used	   for	  movement,	   but	  only	  using	  AIM.	  	  
Motion-­‐guiding	  vision	  provides	  the	  limbs	  with	  egocentric	  coordinates	  that	  they	  can	  use	  
directly,	  without	  the	  need	  to	  translate.	  	  	  
The	   difference	   of	   coding	   accounts	   for	   certain	   other	   discrepancies	   between	  
conscious	  image	  and	  performance	  in	  reach-­‐to-­‐grasp	  manoeuvres.	  	  It	  was	  shown	  a	  while	  
ago	   that	   the	  hand	   reacts	   to	  positional	   shifts	  of	   a	   target	   that	   are	  not	   consciously	   seen	  
(Goodale,	  Péllison,	  and	  Prablanc	  1986).	  	  When	  subjects	  reach	  for	  a	  target	  that	  is	  shifted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  Santello,	  Flanders,	  and	  Soechting	  2002;	  Winges,	  Weber,	  and	  Santello	  2003	  for	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  
this	   claim.	   	   Santello	   and	   co-­‐workers	   show	   that	   simulated	   actions	   are	   deficient	   in	   some	   ways,	   but	   can	  
approach	  visually	  guided	  action	  in	  other	  ways.	  
5	  I	  practised	  writing	  rows	  of	  letters	  with	  my	  eyes	  both	  open	  and	  shut.	  The	  shut-­‐eye	  efforts	  were	  nearly	  as	  
good	  with	  respect	  to	  uniformity	  of	  height	  and	  legibility,	  but	  quite	  a	  bit	  worse	  with	  respect	  to	  alignment	  
with	  the	  line.	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during	   a	   subject	   eye-­‐saccade	   (just	   before	   the	   reaching	   action	   is	   completed),	   they	   are	  
able	  to	  adjust	  their	  reach	  to	  the	  new	  position,	  even	  though	  they	  report	  not	  having	  seen	  
it.	   	   This	   indicates	   a	  non-­‐congruity	  between	   the	   conscious	   visual	   image	  and	  egocentric	  
positioning.	  	  Again,	  size-­‐contrast	  illusions	  –	  displays	  in	  which	  a	  target	  appears	  larger	  or	  
smaller	   than	   it	   really	   is	   because	   of	   contrasting	   objects	   in	   the	   display	   –	   do	   not	  much	  
affect	  grasping.	  	  The	  target	  may	  look	  larger	  than	  it	  is,	  but	  when	  a	  subject	  reaches	  out	  to	  
grasp	   it,	   she	   sizes	   her	   grip	   appropriately	   (Aglioti,	   DeSousa	   and	   Goodale	   1995).	   	   Once	  
again,	   this	   shows	   a	   mismatch	   between	   the	   conscious	   visual	   image	   and	   the	   one	  
determining	  movement	  toward	  the	  target.	  	  
It	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   both	   discrepancies	   mentioned	   in	   the	   preceding	  
paragraph	   arise	   from	   the	   differing	   functions	   of	   descriptive	   and	   motor-­‐guiding	   vision.	  	  
Descriptive	   vision	   is	   concerned	   with	   viewer-­‐independent	   position,	   and	   suppresses	  
random	   and	   sudden	   shifts	   because	   in	   all	   probability	   they	   arise	   from	   shifts	   in	   viewer	  
position.	   	   But	   as	   far	   as	   motion-­‐guidance	   is	   concerned,	   it	   is	   irrelevant	   whether	   these	  
shifts	  are	  due	  to	  target	  or	  viewer	  movement	  –	  either	  way,	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  control	  of	  
movement,	   and	   are	   not	   to	   be	   suppressed	   as	   far	   as	   this	   application	   is	   concerned.	  	  
Similarly,	   descriptive	   vision	   is	   concerned	   with	   object-­‐size,	   and	   uses	   visual	   context	   to	  
discount	   perspectival	   variation.	   	   By	   contrast,	   motion-­‐guiding	   vision	   is	   not	   concerned	  
with	  the	  perspective-­‐independent	  size	  of	  the	  target,	  but	  just	  with	  where	  the	  fingers	  are	  
relative	   to	   the	   target.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   conscious	   visual	   image	   derives	   from	  
descriptive	  vision,	  it	  diverges	  from	  what	  is	  needed	  by	  motor-­‐control	  functions.	  
Conclusion	  2	   [BV]	  and	  [BE]	  are	  not	  artificially	  distinguished	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  image.	   	  On-­‐
line	  vision	  uses	  [BE]	  in	  visual	  guidance	  of	  bodily	  movement.	  
V. Visual	  Objects	  
I	  argued	  earlier	  that	  vision	  directly	  gives	  us	  awareness	  concerning	  certain	  objects.	  	  I	  now	  
want	  to	  show	  that	  some	  of	  these	  are	  material	  objects.	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This	  sounds	  truistic,	  but	  it	  is	  actually	  somewhat	  controversial.	  	  For	  as	  David	  Lewis	  
(1966)	   once	   wrote	   (summarizing	   a	   1949	   report	   by	   Roderick	   Firth):	   “Those	   in	   the	  
traditions	  of	  British	  empiricism	  and	  introspectionist	  psychology	  hold	  that	  the	  content	  of	  
visual	  experience	  is	  a	  sensuously	  given	  mosaic	  of	  colour-­‐spots,	  together	  with	  a	  mass	  of	  
interpretive	  judgements	  injected	  by	  the	  subject”	  (357).	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  vision	  presents	  
the	  perceiving	  subject	  with	  such	  a	  “colour-­‐mosaic”,	  which	  the	  subject	  interprets	  in	  order	  	  
to	  construct	  a	  scene	  with	  objects	  distributed	  in	  the	  external	  world.	  	  	  
More	   recently,	   Austen	   Clark	   (2000)	   has	   constructed	   a	   theory	   in	   which	   the	  
content	  of	  visual	  experience	  consists	  of	  visual	   features	  attributed	  to	  places	   in	  a	   three-­‐
dimensional	  visual	  field.	  	  Clark’s	  visual	  features	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  colours,	  and	  are	  not	  
spatially	   minimal.	   	   They	   include	   “colour,	   luminance,	   relative	   motion,	   size,	   texture,	  
flicker,	   line	   orientation”	   (186).	   	   However,	   the	   content	   of	   visual	   experience	   does	   not	  
include	  material	  objects,	  according	  to	  Clark	  –	  in	  his	  view,	  visual	  features	  are	  attributed	  
to	  places,	  not	  material	  objects.	   	  “The	  characterization	  of	  appearance	  seems	  to	  require	  
reference	  to	  phenomenal	  individuals:	  the	  regions	  or	  volumes	  at	  which	  qualities	  seem	  to	  
be	   located,”	   he	   says	   (61)	   –	   the	   regions	   or	   volumes	   are	   subjects	   and	   the	   features	   are	  
predicates.	   	   Clark	   uses	   the	   term	   “feature-­‐placing”	   to	   describe	   the	   kind	   of	   content	   he	  
ascribes	  to	  visual	  experience.	  	  	  
So,	   according	   to	   both	   the	   British	   empiricists	   of	   the	   Lewis-­‐Firth	   report	   and	   a	  
sophisticated	   contemporary	   philosopher	   of	   cognitive	   science	   steeped	   in	   recent	  
neuropsychology	  literature,	  material	  objects	  are	  not	  delivered	  by	  vision.	  	  
There	   are	   good	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   that	   the	   feature-­‐placing	   view	   is	  mistaken.	  	  
To	  start	  with,	  it	  doesn’t	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  visual	  features	  are	  predicated	  of	  places.	  	  
Susanna	  Siegel	  (2002)	  puts	  the	  point	  well	  in	  a	  review	  of	  Clark	  (2000):	  
[Clark]	   repeatedly	   says	   that	   sensory	   systems	   attribute	   qualities	   to	   places.	   	   For	   example	  
"The	  sensation	  of	  a	  red	  triangle	  ...	  picks	  out	  places	  and	  attributes	  features	  to	  them"	  (147;	  
cf.	  69,	  70,	  77,	  165,	  167,	  185).	  	  Taken	  literally,	  these	  claims	  seem	  questionable.	  	  If	  audition	  
told	   us	   that	   it	  was	   a	   place,	   rather	   than	   something	   at	   that	   place,	   that	  was	   cheeping,	  we	  
would	  have	  all	  sorts	  of	  errors	  to	  correct	  in	  the	  move	  from	  audition	  to	  thought.	  	  We	  would	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be	   similarly	   misled	   by	   vision	   if	   it	   told	   us	   that	   a	   certain	   region	   of	   space	   was	   red,	   while	  
remaining	  neutral	  on	  whether	  anything	  occupying	  that	  place	  was	  red.	  (137)	  
Siegel’s	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  literally	  false	  to	  say	  that	  a	  place	  is	  coloured,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  making	  
a	  sound	  (as	  opposed	  to	  saying	  that	   there	   is	  something	  coloured	   in	   the	  place	  or	   that	  a	  
sound	   was	   emanating	   from	   it).	   	   It	   is	   false,	   if	   for	   no	   other	   reason,	   then	   because	   the	  
material	  object	  will	  take	  its	  colour	  and	  its	  noises	  with	  it	  when	  it	  moves.	  	  The	  colour	  that	  
resides	  in	  a	  place	  can	  change	  simply	  because	  the	  thing	  that	  occupies	  it	  is	  replaced.	  	  It	  is	  
for	  such	  reasons	  that	  while	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	  to	  say	  that	  colours	  are	   in	  places,	  it	  is	  
not	  permissible	  to	  say	  that	  colours	  are	  predicated	  of	  them.	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  point	  to	  consider	  is	  that	  visual	  data	  processing	  employs	  algorithms	  that	  
work	  only	  because	  they	  are	  applied	  to	  material	  objects.	  	  That	  is,	  visual	  data	  processing	  
would	  not	  deliver	  veridical	  experience	  if	  the	  world	  were	  not	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  Consider	  this	  
display	  in	  Dale	  Purves	  and	  Beau	  Lotto	  (2003,	  57)6:	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  figure	  appears	  with	  the	  kind	  permission	  of	  Beau	  Lotto.	  See:	  	  
http://www.lottolab.org/illusiondemos/Demo%2016.html.	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Light	  appears	  to	  be	  striking	  this	  object	  from	  somewhere	  behind.	  (Notice	  the	  shadow	  it	  
casts	  in	  front,	  and	  the	  shade	  that	  envelops	  its	  front	  side.)	  	  Each	  stripe	  looks	  uniform	  in	  
colour,	  but	  less	  brightly	  illuminated	  on	  the	  front	  side.	  	  Now,	  it	  seems	  clear	  in	  the	  image	  
above	  that	  the	  dark	  stripes	  running	  along	  the	  top	  of	  the	  object	  are	  considerably	  darker	  
than	  the	  light	  stripes	  on	  the	  front	  –	  the	  former	  look	  a	  darker	  grey.	   	   In	  fact,	  as	  you	  will	  
discover	   if	  you	  cover	  everything	  else	  up,	   the	   lower	  parts	  of	   the	   light	  stripes	   (the	  parts	  
that	  look	  as	  if	  they	  are	  in	  the	  shade)	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  brightness	  as	  the	  upper	  parts	  
of	  the	  dark	  stripes.	  	  	  
The	   illusion	   is	   explained	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   colour	   of	   the	   stripes	   is	   computed	  
against	  the	  background	  of	  assumptions	  concerning	  how	  opaque	  objects	  intercept	  light.	  
Since	   the	   brightness	   gradient	   decreases	   uniformly	   in	   a	   way	   that	   indicates	   indirect	  
lighting,	   the	   visual	   system	   delivers	   experience	   as	   of	   stripes	   of	   uniform	   reflectance.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  corresponding	  true	  assumption	  about	  places	  –	  places	  are	  not	  opaque;	  they	  
do	  not	  intercept	  light.	  	  There	  is	  no	  shade	  or	  shadow	  in	  a	  world	  of	  places.	  	  	  
Vision	   is	   adapted,	   then,	   to	   the	   contingent	   presence	   in	   the	   world	   of	   things	   of	  
particular	  sorts.	  	  Zenon	  Pylyshyn	  (2007)	  puts	  it	  in	  this	  way:	  
The	   mind	   has	   been	   tuned	   over	   its	   evolutionary	   history	   so	   that	   it	   carries	   out	   certain	  
functions	  in	  a	  modular	  fashion,	  without	  regard	  for	  what	  an	  organism	  knows	  or	  believes	  or	  
desires,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  in	  its	  nature.	  (ix)	  
Looking	  at	   the	  Purves-­‐Lotto	  display	  above,	   it	   is	  clear	   that,	  whatever	  one	  might	  believe	  
about	  the	  natural	  world,	  the	  visual	  world	  is	  simply	  not	  presented	  as	  a	  world	  of	  places.	  	  
And	   this	   is	   because	   vision	   computes	   brightness	   as	   if	   it	   is	   dealing	   with	   a	   world	   that	  
contains	   opaque	   material	   objects.	   Elizabeth	   Spelke	   (1990)	   has	   written	   that	   vision	  
identifies	  material	  objects	  by	  their	  “cohesion,	  boundedness,	  rigidity,	  and	  no	  action	  at	  a	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distance”.	  	  These	  conditions	  are	  characteristic	  of	  material	  objects,	  and	  hence	  they	  have	  
come	  to	  function	  as	  principles	  for	  the	  segmentation	  of	  scenes	  into	  visual	  objects.7	  	  
Now	  consider	  how	  motion	  is	  perceived.	  	  Again,	  Siegel	  (2002)	  puts	  the	  point	  well:	  	  
What	  happens	  in	  sensory	  phenomenology	  when	  a	  subject	  sees	  a	  basketball	  make	  its	  way	  
from	   the	   player's	   hands	   to	   the	   basket?	   The	   information	   that	   it's	   one	   and	   the	   same	  
basketball	   traversing	   a	   single	   path	   is	   not	   given	   by	   sentience	   if	   sentience	   is	   limited	   to	  
feature-­‐placing.	   On	   Clark's	   view,	   the	   information	   that	   it's	   one	   and	   the	   same	   basketball	  
traversing	   a	   single	   path	   has	   to	   be	   given	   non-­‐sensorily.	   The	   subject's	   visual	   experience	  
stops	  short.	  (137)	  
To	  emphasize	   the	  point,	   consider	   the	  beta-­‐phenomenon.8	   	  A	   light	   flashes	   to	  your	   left,	  
goes	  off,	  and	  then	  another	  light	  flashes	  somewhat	  over	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  first	  one.	  	  If	  
the	  interval	  is	  quite	  long	  –	  five	  seconds,	  say	  –	  the	  two	  flashes	  are	  seen	  as	  unconnected	  –	  
a	  flash	  here,	  another	  flash	  there.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  interval	  decreases,	  the	  display	  is	  seen	  
as	  a	  moving	  light.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  light	  is	  seen	  as	  traversing	  the	  empty	  space	  in	  between	  the	  
two	  flashes.	  	  What	  is	  the	  subjective	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  displays?	  	  Clearly,	  just	  
that	   in	   the	   second	   case	   there	   is	   an	   illusory	   appearance	  of	  motion.	   	   But	  places	  do	  not	  
move:	  motion	  consists	  of	  the	  same	  thing	  occupying	  different	  places	  at	  different	  times.	  	  	  
Thus,	   Clark,	   who	   restricts	   visual	   ontology	   to	   places,	   cannot	   explain	   how	   vision	   can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	   This	   leads	   to	   certain	   oddities	   of	   visual	   ontology:	   vision	   renders	   immaterial	   things	   such	   as	   images	   in	  
mirrors,	   shadows,	   stains,	   and	   patches	   of	   light	   as	   visual	   objects.	   	   These	   appear	   as	   objects	   because	   they	  
approximate	  Spelke’s	  principles	  most	  of	  the	  time	  –	  though	  since	  shadows	  are	  cast	  on	  the	  nearest	  object	  
that	   the	   light	   intercepts,	   they	  may	   suddenly	  expand	  or	   contract,	   and	  are	  non-­‐rigid.	   	   Cast	   shadows	   look	  
object-­‐like,	   though	   they	  are	  visually	  distinguishable	   from	  material	  objects,	  but	   shade	   (as	   in	   the	   sides	  of	  
objects	  facing	  away	  from	  illumination)	  does	  not	  look	  object-­‐like.	  
8	  The	  phenomenon	  I	  am	  about	  to	  describe	  was	  called	  “beta”	  by	  Max	  Wertheimer,	  though	  it	  is	  mistakenly	  
called	  ‘phi’	  in	  common	  parlance	  (and	  by	  me	  in	  2005,	  chapter	  12).	  	  The	  rather	  different	  phenomenon	  that	  
Wertheimer	  called	  phi	  is	  produced	  by	  rapid	  alternating	  flicker.	  	  In	  phi,	  we	  seem	  to	  see	  an	  occluder	  moving	  
in	  front	  of	  the	  flickering	  lights.	  	  This	  occluder	  appears	  to	  be	  of	  the	  same	  colour	  as	  the	  background:	  it	  is	  a	  
kind	   of	   negative	   space	   that	   appears	   in	   front	   of	   the	   light	   that	   is	   flickering	   “down”	   –	   the	   momentarily	  
dimmer	  one.	  
See	  http://www1.psych.purdue.edu/Magniphi/PhiIsNotBeta/index.html	  for	  details.	  	  
VISUAL	  DEMONSTRATIVES	  
	   17	  
generate	  the	  appearance	  of	  motion.9	  	  Yet,	  as	  Pylyshyn	  has	  long	  argued,	  vision	  not	  only	  
detects	  movement,	  but	  also	  tracks	  objects	  and	  their	  features	  through	  movement.	  	  	  
This	  is	  a	  world	  in	  which	  most	  surfaces	  that	  we	  see	  are	  surfaces	  of	  physical	  objects,	  so	  that	  
most	   of	   the	   texture	   elements	  we	   see	  move	   coherently	   as	   the	   object	  moves;	   almost	   all	  
elements	  nearby	  on	   the	  proximal	   image	  are	  at	   the	  same	  distance	   from	  the	  viewer;	  and,	  
when	  objects	  disappear,	  they	  often	  reappear	  nearby,	  and	  often	  with	  a	  particular	  pattern	  
of	  occlusion	  and	  disocclusion	  at	   the	  edges	  of	   the	  occluding	  opaque	  surfaces,	  and	  so	  on.	  
(2007,	  x)	  
What	  we	  seem	  to	  see	   in	  beta	   is	  a	  material	  object	   in	  motion;	  vision	  finds	   it	  through	  an	  
application	  of	  Spelke’s	  principles.	  	  
Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   evidence	   of	   visual	   perception	   in	   infants.	   	   Elisabeth	   Spelke,	  
Renée	   Baillargeon,	   and	   others	   have	   observed	   the	   orderly	   emergence	   of	   object	  
perception	  in	  infants	  as	  they	  grow	  up.	  	  They	  found	  results	  like	  these:	  	  
Infants	  were	  found	  to	  perceive	  a	  partly	  hidden	  object	  as	  a	  connected	  unit	   if	   the	  ends	  of	  
the	  object	  moved	  together	  behind	  the	  occluder.	   	  Any	  unitary	  translation	  of	  the	  object	   in	  
three-­‐dimensional	   space	   led	   infants	   to	  perceive	  a	   continuous	  object:	  Vertical	   translation	  
and	   translation	   in	   depth	   had	   the	   same	   effect	   as	   lateral	   translation	   .	   .	   .	   Perception	   of	   a	  
moving,	   center-­‐occluded	   object	   was	   not	   affected	   by	   the	   object’s	   configurational	  
properties:	  Infants	  perceived	  a	  connected	  object	  just	  as	  strongly	  when	  the	  object’s	  visible	  
surfaces	  when	  the	  object’s	  visible	  surfaces	  were	  asymmetric	  and	  heterogeneous	  in	  texture	  
and	   color	   as	  when	   they	   formed	   a	   simple	   shape	   of	   a	   uniform	   texture	   and	   color.	   (Spelke	  
1990,	  33)	  
If	   these	   principles	   of	   object-­‐segmentation	   were	   learned,	   as	   was	   assumed	   in	   the	  
empiricist	   tradition,	   the	   pace	   of	   their	   emergence	   in	   infants	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   Clark	   (2004,	   569)	   responds:	   “flow	   patterns	   can	   give	   a	   powerful	   impression	   of	   movement	   (your	  
movement)	  even	  though	  you	  do	  not	  perceive	  any	  thing	  to	  be	  moving”	  –	  and	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  blur	  or	  
streak	  created	  by	  a	  rapidly	  moving	  object,	  in	  which	  the	  object	  itself	  is	  not	  seen.	  	  This	  response	  misses	  the	  
point	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  see	  an	  object	  moving	  in	  rapid	  optic	  flow,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  
we	  do	  see	  an	  object	  moving	  in	  the	  beta-­‐phenomenon,	  and	  when	  we	  look	  at	  a	  ball	  being	  thrown.	  	  In	  these	  
cases,	  we	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  temporal	  succession	  of	  coloured	  places.	  	  Secondly,	  it	   is	  not	  necessary	  to	  
see	  the	  thing	  to	  which	  motion	  is	  attributed	  in	  order	  to	  see	  motion	  attributed	  to	  a	  thing.	  	  In	  the	  visual	  blur	  
of	  a	  fastball,	  we	  see	  something	  moving	  very	  fast	  without	  seeing	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  moving	  very	  fast.	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proportionate	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  exposure	  that	  a	  given	   infant	  has	  to	  the	  relevant	  data,	  
and	   the	   infant’s	   quickness	   to	   generalize.	   	   And	   we	   would	   also	   expect	   that	   individual	  
humans	   would	   arrive	   at	   slightly	   different	   (though	   perhaps	   broadly	   accurate)	  
segmentation	   principles	   –	   in	   the	   way	   that	   they	   arrive	   at	   different	   principles	   of,	   say,	  
parallel	  parking	  or	  differentiating	  between	  the	  music	  of	  Mozart	  and	  Haydn.	  	  But	  they	  do	  
not.	  	  Object	  segmentation	  emerges	  at	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  age	  in	  all	  infants,	  and	  the	  
principles	  are	  the	  same	  from	  one	  to	  another.	  	  This	  is	  evidence	  that	  they	  are	  innate,	  and	  
their	  emergence	  a	  matter	  of	  ontogeny	  and	  development	  rather	  than	  learning.	  
Conclusion	  3	  Vision	  delivers	  direct	  awareness	  of	  material	  objects.	  	  
VI. Visual	  Reference	  
Visual	  states	  are	  about	   individual	  things.	   	  And	  this	  creates	  a	  puzzle.	   	  Suppose	  I	  am	  in	  a	  
darkened	  room,	  looking	  at	  an	  illuminated	  blue	  sphere	  –	  call	   it	  S1.	   	  Later,	  I	  am	  taken	  to	  
another	  darkened	  room,	  and	  I	  look	  at	  another	  illuminated	  blue	  sphere,	  S2.	  	  Now	  it	  may	  
be	   that	   since	   these	   two	   spheres	   look	   just	   the	   same,	   I	   have	   indistinguishable	   visual	  
experiences	  in	  the	  two	  rooms.	  	  Yet	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  the	  first	  room	  my	  visual	  states	  were	  
targeted	  on	  S1,	  while	  in	  the	  second	  they	  are	  targeted	  on	  S2.	   	  How	  does	  it	  come	  about	  
that	   subjectively	   indistinguishable	   visual	   states	   can	   be	   directed	   toward	   different	  
objects?	  	  Note	  that	  an	  image,	  such	  as	  a	  photograph,	  does	  not	  change	  its	  reference	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  –	  it	  is	  targeted	  on	  the	  same	  individual	  regardless	  of	  where	  I	  look	  at	  it.	  
One	  possibility	  is	  that	  visual	  states	  single	  out	  their	  objects	  in	  a	  purely	  descriptive	  
way.	  	  Suppose	  I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  red	  disc	  at	  place	  p.	  	  According	  to	  the	  descriptivist	  theory,	  
the	  thing	  I	  see	  is	  that	  which	  most	  closely	  resembles	  what	  I	  seem	  to	  see.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  object	  of	  my	  visual	  state	  is	  that	  which	  most	  closely	  satisfies	  the	  descriptive	  content	  
of	  my	  visual	  state.	  	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  the	  content	  of	  my	  two	  visual	  experiences	  is	  
‘blue	  sphere	  in	  front	  of	  me’	  or	  possibly	  ‘blue	  sphere	  in	  front	  of	  me	  that	  is	  causing	  me	  to	  
have	  this	  experience’.	  	  In	  the	  two	  rooms,	  different	  objects	  satisfy	  this	  description.	  	  The	  
two	  experiences	  are	  the	  “same”	  because	  they	  both	  have	  this	  content	  –	  but	  the	  content	  
is	  satisfied	  by	  different	  referents	  in	  different	  situations.	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The	  descriptivist	  theory	  cannot	  properly	  accommodate	  misperception.	  	  Let	  x	  be	  
the	  thing	  I	  see.	  	  I	  may	  misperceive	  x	  –	  suppose	  that	  x	  is	  orange,	  and	  that	  I	  misperceive	  it	  
as	   red.	   	   Then,	   nothing	   satisfies	   the	   descriptive	   content	   of	   my	   visual	   state.	   	   The	  
descriptive	  theory	  would	  then	  imply	  that	  I	  perceive	  nothing	  (or,	   if	  formulated	  so	  that	  I	  
perceive	  whatever	  comes	  closest,	  that	  I	  see	  a	  nearby	  red	  thing,	  even	  though	  this	  other	  
thing	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  my	  visual	  state).	   	  But	  this	  seems	  wrong:	  it	   is	  x	  I	  see,	  even	  
though	  I	  misperceive	  it.	  	  	  
It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  all	  of	   the	  visual	  and	  non-­‐visual	   ideas	   that	  we	  have	  been	  
discussing	  so	  far	  are	  subject	  to	  error	  in	  this	  manner.	  	  One	  can	  be	  wrong	  about	  an	  object	  
being	  a	  squash-­‐ball,	  one	  may	  misperceive	  its	  colour	  and	  shape,	  one	  may	  be	  wrong	  about	  
where	  it	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  egocentric	  coordinates.	  	  
What	  makes	   x	   the	   thing	   that	   I	   see,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   that	   it	   satisfies	   the	   descriptive	  
content	  of	  my	  visual	  state?	  	  In	  a	  classic	  article,	  H.	  P.	  Grice	  (1961)	  argued	  that	  x	  is	  what	  I	  
see	  because	  it	  causes	  my	  visual	  state	  (in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  way).	  	  This	  theory	  offers	  us	  an	  
initially	   satisfactory	   result:	   it	   allows	   that	   even	   things	   that	   are	   radically	   misperceived	  
could	  be	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  perceptual	  states.	   	  This	  result	  runs	  counter	  to	  descriptivist	  
theories	   in	   the	   right	   kind	   of	  way.	   	   However,	   I	   am	   thinking	   of	   visual	   states	   as	   reason-­‐
conferring	  states:	  states	  that	  rationally	  lead	  to	  thoughts	  and	  beliefs.	  	  Let	  us	  say	  that:	  	  
A	  visual	  state	  V	   is	  about	  x	   if	  and	  only	   if	  V	  directly	  and	  by	  itself	  gives	  the	  
perceiver	   grounds	   for	  believing	   something	  about	  x	  –	   in	  brief,	   if	   it	  x	   is	   a	  
direct	  epistemic	  target	  of	  V.	  	  	  
I	  will	   argue	   that	  Grice’s	   approach	  does	   not	   always	   give	   us	   the	   right	   result	   concerning	  
direct	  epistemic	  targets.	  	  Grice	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  locution	  ‘S	  sees	  x’,	  
but	  if	  so,	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  what	  one	  sees	  is	  not	  always	  the	  direct	  epistemic	  target	  of	  
one’s	  visual	  state.	  
Under	  what	  conditions	  does	  a	  visual	  state	  constitute	  grounds	  for	  a	  perceiver	  to	  
have	   a	   thought	   about	   an	   object?	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   misperception	   described	   above,	  
something	  looks	  to	  me	  as	  if	  it	  is	  red.	  	  That	  it	  looks	  this	  way	  to	  me	  gives	  me	  a	  defeasible	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reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  it	  is	  a	  red	  disc.	  	  The	  visual	  state	  that	  I	  have	  described	  puts	  me	  in	  
direct	   contact	   with	   x	   for	   epistemic	   purposes,	   though	   it	   is	   not	   accurate	   as	   far	   as	   the	  
colour	  of	  x	  is	  concerned.	  	  And	  it	  may	  be	  that	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  Grice’s	  theory	  works	  
–	  the	  object	  to	  which	  I	  gain	  direct	  epistemic	  access	  by	  means	  of	  my	  visual	  state	  is,	  as	  it	  
happens,	   the	   thing	   that	   I	   see	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   object	   that	   caused	  me	   to	   have	  my	   visual	  
experience.	  	  
But	   now	   think	  of	   a	   different	   kind	  of	   case.	   	   Suppose	   that	   I	   am	   looking	   at	   a	   red	  
button	  and	   its	  reflection	   in	  a	  mirror.	   	  The	   image	   is	  not	  a	  physical	  object,	  and	   it	  has	  no	  
causal	  power.	  	  It	  causes	  nothing.	  	  All	  the	  information	  that	  my	  eye	  receives	  comes	  from	  
and	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  real	  button.	  	  According	  to	  Grice’s	  theory,	  then,	  I	  see	  only	  one	  thing	  
here,	  the	  real	  button,	  though	  I	  see	  it	  twice.	  	  However	  –	  and	  this	  is	  my	  point	  –	  my	  view	  of	  
the	   image	  does	  not	  directly	  and	  by	   itself	  give	  me	  reason	  to	  believe	  of	   the	   real	  button	  
that	  it	  is	  red.	  	  It	  directly	  gives	  me	  reason	  only	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  image	  is	  red.	  	  My	  view	  
of	  the	  image	  gives	  me	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  button	  is	  red	  only	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
further	  beliefs	  about	  mirrors	  and	  images.	  	  	  
Here	   is	   another	   kind	   of	   example.	   	   You	   are	   in	   a	   cloud	   of	   fruit	   flies.	   You	   see	  
hundreds	   of	   little	   specks.	   	   In	   Grice’s	   view,	   you	   see	   each	   and	   every	   fly,	   because	   each	  
causes	  some	  part	  of	  your	  visual	  image.	  	  But	  this	  visual	  state	  does	  not	  give	  you	  a	  reason	  
to	  believe	  of	  any	  particular	  fly	  that	  it	  has	  any	  particular	  property.	  	  Let’s	  suppose	  that	  the	  
flies	  all	  look	  yellow.	  	  This	  gives	  you	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  every	  fly	  is	  yellow.	  	  But	  in	  my	  
view,	  this	  still	  does	  not	  give	  you	  a	  reason	  to	  believe	  of	  any	  particular	  fly	  that	  it	  is	  yellow.	  	  
The	  reason	  is	  that	  you	  cannot	  visually	  single	  out	  any	  particular	  fly.	  	  You	  can	  form	  beliefs	  
about	  a	  particular	  fly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  how	  things	  look	  to	  you	  only	  if	  you	  can	  visually	  single	  
it	  out.	  	  
Here	   is	  a	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	  direct	  epistemic	   targets	   that	   is	  consonant	  with	  
these	  observations.	  	  	  
A	  visual	  state	  V	  has	  x	  as	  its	  direct	  epistemic	  target,	  only	  if	  V	  directly	  and	  
by	  itself	  enables	  the	  perceiver	  visually	  to	  attend	  to	  x.	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One	  cannot	  form	  a	  perceptual	  belief	  about	  an	  individual	  based	  on	  a	  visual	  state	  unless	  
one	  attends	   to	   that	   individual.	   	   It	   follows	   that	   taken	  by	   itself	   a	   visual	   state	   can	  give	  a	  
perceiver	   unmediated	   grounds	   for	   believing	   something	   about	   an	   individual	   only	   if	   it	  
enables	  the	  subject	  to	  attend	  to	  that	  individual.	  	  	  
This	   gives	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   result	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   indistinguishable	   blue	  
spheres.	  	  Each	  visual	  state	  enables	  me	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  sphere	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  in	  front	  of	  
me,	  and	  not	  the	  other	  one.	  	  It	  gives	  the	  right	  result	  also	  about	  misperception:	  one	  may	  
well	  be	  able	  to	  attend	  to	  an	  object	  despite	  being	  mistaken	  about	  its	  colour.	  	  Finally,	  the	  
proposal	   is	  designed	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   fruit-­‐fly	   case.	   	  You	  can	  visually	   single	   something	  
out	  only	  if	  you	  can	  attend	  to	  it.	  	  Attention	  gives	  the	  condition	  under	  which	  one	  can	  not	  
only	   receive	   information	   from	   an	   object,	   but	   also	   use	   that	   information	   to	   arrive	   at	  
beliefs	  about	  the	  individual.10	  	  
Now,	   being	   able	   to	   attend	   to	   something	   is,	   among	   other	   things,	   a	   physical	  
capacity.	  	  It	  depends	  on	  the	  subject’s	  ability	  to	  turn	  his	  eyes	  to	  the	  thing,	  fixate	  it,	  focus	  
on	   it,	   etc.	   	   By	   conclusion	   2	   above,	   it	   follows	   that	   vision	   controls	   attention	   through	  
egocentric	  location	  coordinates.	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  can	  do	  this	  in	  error;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  stick	  
partly	  underwater,	  for	   instance,	  vision	  may	  direct	  your	  attention	  to	  a	   location	  that	  the	  
stick	  does	  not	  occupy.	  	  But	  this	  is	  immaterial:	  attention	  is	  to	  the	  thing,	  not	  the	  location.	  	  
The	  point	   that	   I	   find	   important	  here	   is	   that	   a	   first	   condition	   for	   forming	  beliefs	   about	  
things	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  vision	  is	  that	  one	  is	  able	  physically	  to	  react	  to	  it.	  	  	  
Conclusion	   4	   The	   direct	   epistemic	   target	   of	   a	   visual	   state,	   X,	   is	   that	   to	   which	   the	  
egocentric	  coordinates	  [XE]	  directs	  your	  attention.	  	  	  
VII. Indexicality	  
Paul	  Snowdon	  (1981,	  1990)	  makes	  a	  suggestion	  about	  direct	  epistemic	  targets	  that	  has	  a	  
great	   deal	   in	   common	   with	   the	   one	   advanced	   in	   the	   preceding	   section.	   	   Snowdon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  broadly	  consonant	  with	  John	  Campbell’s	  (2002)	  treatment	  of	  visual	  reference.	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proposes	  that	  when	  you	  visually	  perceive	  something,	  you	  are	  thereby	  capable	  of	  making	  
a	   demonstrative	   judgement	   about	   it.	   Vision	   cannot	   give	   you	   reason	   to	   believe	  
something	  about	  a	  particular	  object,	  unless	  it	  bestows	  upon	  you,	  directly	  and	  by	  itself,	  
the	  ability	  to	  single	  the	  thing	  out	  and	  attend	  to	  it.	  	  This	  is	  a	  physical	  ability	  cognate	  with	  
the	  ability	  to	  point	  to	  the	  thing,	  move	  toward	  it,	  and	  make	  a	  demonstrative	  judgement	  
about	  it.	  	  	  
I	   want	   to	   flesh	   out	   this	   suggestion	   in	   a	   way	   that	   ties	   it	   to	   the	   visual	   ideas	  
discussed	  earlier.	   	  My	  addendum	  to	  Snowdon’s	  suggestion	   is	  that	  vision	  singles	  out	   its	  
object	   by	   furnishing	   the	   perceiver	   with	   an	   egocentric	   location	   for	   that	   object.	   	   The	  
location	   is	   not	   provided	   “explicitly”	   –	   that	   is,	   seeing	   something	   does	   not	   enable	   a	  
perceiver	  to	  say	  where	  things	  are	  relative	  to	  her.	   	  Rather,	  seeing	  something	  enables	  a	  
perceiver	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  thing	  and	  orient	  herself	  relative	  to	  it.	  
Egocentric	   coordinates	   are	   indexical.	   	   They	   determine	   a	   particular	   position	   in	  
space,	  given	  the	  perceiver’s	  own	  position.	  	  For	  any	  object	  that	  the	  perceiver	  sees,	  vision	  
specifies	  egocentric	  coordinates	  for	  the	  object.	   	  These	  egocentric	  coordinates	  uniquely	  
determine	  which	  objects	  the	  perceiver	  sees	  because	  it	  directs	  my	  attention	  to	  it.	  	  When	  
I	  look	  at	  my	  computer,	  I	  see	  it.	  	  At	  home,	  I	  may	  have	  an	  exactly	  similar	  visual	  experience,	  
because	  I	  am	  editing	  the	  same	  document	  on	  an	  exactly	  similar	  computer.	  	  Yet	  it	   is	  this	  
computer	  I	  now	  see,	  not	  the	  one	  at	  home.	   	  This	   is	  because	  the	  egocentric	  coordinates	  
that	  my	  visual	  system	  gives	  me	  for	  the	  computer	  are	  indexed	  to	  my	  current	  location,	  not	  
my	   home	   location.	   	   Thus,	   visual	   reference	   is	   not	   purely	   descriptive	   –	   it	   is	   indexical.	  	  
(With	  a	  photograph,	  it	  is	  different:	  images	  presented	  in	  a	  photograph	  are	  not	  indexed	  to	  
my	  current	  location,	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  photograph	  does	  not	  enable	  me	  to	  orient	  myself	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  object	  depicted	  by	  it.)	  
Now,	  only	  objects	  in	  real	  space	  can	  be	  assigned	  egocentric	  coordinates.	  Objects	  
such	  as	   the	  “stars”,	  or	  phosphenes,	   that	  appear	  when	  we	  receive	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  head,	  
after-­‐images,	  etc.,	  have	  no	  position	  in	  space.	  	  Hence,	  they	  cannot	  be	  demonstrated.	  	  An	  
after-­‐image	  has	  no	  position;	  hence	  its	  position	  cannot	  be	  indicated.	  	  Even	  if	  such	  things	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appear,	  in	  some	  sense,	  to	  be	  in	  front	  of	  one,	  they	  do	  not	  look	  as	  if	  they	  are	  in	  external	  
space.	  (See	  Siegel	  2006	  for	  discussion	  relevant	  to	  this	  point.)	  	  I’ll	  summarize	  this	  position	  
by	   saying	   that	   these	   private	   phenomena	   have	   only	   phenomenal	   position,	   and	   no	  
egocentric	   position	   in	   the	   sense	   intended.	   	   I	   mean	   thus	   to	   acknowledge	   the	  
appropriateness	   of	   positional	   relations	   such	   as	   ‘to	   the	   left’	   etc.	   for	   images,	   but	   to	  
distinguish	   these	   relations	   from	   those	   that	   imply	   location	   in	   space.	   	   After-­‐images	   are	  
seen	  as	   ‘to	   the	   left’	  etc.,	  but	  not	  as	  occupying	  any	  position	  relative	   to	  me,	  having	  any	  
size	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  my	  body,	  not	  as	  moving	  relative	  to	  my	  body,	  etc.	  
Since	  an	  after-­‐image	  is	  not	  an	  object	  that	  occupies	  space,	   it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  
ask	   whether	   they	   are	   the	   same	   as	   other	   objects	   outside	   of	   space.	   	   Suppose	   you	   are	  
suddenly	   dazzled	   by	   a	   bright	   light	   and	   so	   are	   afflicted	   by	   an	   after-­‐image	   for	   a	   few	  
minutes.	   	  After	  a	  minute	  or	   so,	   somebody	  asks	  you:	   is	   the	  pink	   spot	  you	  now	  see	   the	  
same	  as	  the	  pink	  spot	  you	  saw	  a	  minute	  ago?	  	  There	  is	  no	  good	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  
as	  asked	  –	  the	  after-­‐image	  has	  not	  shown	  spatio-­‐temporal	  continuity	  (since	  it	  occupies	  
the	  same	  position	  in	  your	  visual	  field	  despite	  your	  own	  motion),	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  
has,	  in	  some	  sense,	  persisted.	  	  After-­‐images	  have	  no	  location.	  	  So	  though	  it	  makes	  sense	  
to	  ask	  whether	  the	  disturbance	  in	  your	  visual	  field	  is	  continuous	  and	  located	  in	  the	  same	  
visual	  field-­‐place	  –	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  same	  object.	  	  There	  is	  
no	   object	   here,	   and	   no	   appearance	   of	   one.	   	   As	   Snowdon	   (1981)	   says,	   we	   cannot	  
demonstratively	   identify	   after-­‐images	  and	   the	   like	  –	   “only	  objects,	   so	   to	   speak,	   in	   the	  
world	   can	   be	   so	   identified”	   (190).	   	   With	   such	   phenomena,	   things	   may	   look	   to	   the	  
perceiver	   as	   if	   there	   is	   a	   spot	  of	   light	  or	   floating	   spot	   in	   front	  of	  him,	  but	   there	   is	   no	  
object	   about	  which	   he	   can	   form	   a	   belief,	   and	   hence	   no	   epistemic	   target	   of	   his	   visual	  
state.	  	  	  	  
Only	  on-­‐line	  seeing	  directly	  gives	  you	  egocentric	  location	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  As	  argued	  
in	  section	  IV,	  neither	  recollection	  nor	  mere	  imaging	  is	  capable	  of	  guiding	  bodily	  motion.	  	  
This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  only	  on-­‐line	  seeing	  is	  targeted	  on	  objects.	  	  If	  a	  state	  is	  directly	  
descended	  from	  or	  created	  from	  a	  state	  that	  directly	  gives	  you	  egocentric	  location,	  then	  
it	   is	   targeted	   on	   the	   object	   given	   in	   the	   ancestor	   state.	   	   For	   example,	   when	   I	   try	   to	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imagine	   what	   my	   daughter	   would	   look	   like	   in	   a	   blue	   raincoat	   that	   I	   am	   thinking	   of	  
getting	  her	   as	   a	   birthday	  present,	   the	   image	   I	   conjure	  up	   is	   targeted	  on	  my	  daughter	  
even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  assign	  egocentric	  location	  to	  her.	  	  However,	  this	  state	  does	  not	  
allow	  me	  to	  attend	  to	  my	  daughter,	  or	  gather	  information	  about	  her.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  5	  There	  is	  an	  element	  in	  on-­‐line	  seeing	  (as	  distinct	  from	  recalling,	  imagining,	  
etc)	  that	   indexically	   links	  visual	  states	  to	  external	  objects;	  this	   fails	   for	   internal	  objects	  
such	  as	  phosphenes	  and	  after-­‐images.	  	  
VIII. Disjunctivism	  	  	  
Snowdon	  (1981,	  1990)	  endorses	  a	  view	  known	  as	  disjunctivism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  view	  
about	  demonstratives.	  	  I	  have	  endorsed	  the	  position	  concerning	  demonstratives.	  	  I	  will	  
conclude	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  disjunctivism.	  	  	  
Here	  is	  the	  position	  that	  Snowdon	  advances:	  
DIS.	  	  The	  best	  theory	  for	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  reported	  by	  ‘I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  
flash	   of	   light’	   is	   that	   EITHER	   there	   is	   something	   I	   can	   demonstratively	  
identify	  that	  looks	  to	  me	  to	  be	  a	  flash	  of	  light	  OR	  it	  is	  to	  me	  as	  if	  there	  is	  
something	  that	  I	  can	  demonstratively	  identify	  that	  looks	  to	  me	  as	  if	  it	  is	  a	  
flash	  of	  light	  (but	  there	  is	  not).11	  
By	  saying	  that	  this	  is	  the	  ‘best	  theory’,	  Snowdon	  means	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  two	  disjuncts	  
specifically	  describe	  different	  kinds	  of	  situations,	  each	  of	  which	  would	  be	  correctly,	  but	  
non-­‐specifically,	  described	  by	  ‘I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  flash	  of	  light’.	  	  Thus,	  neither	  disjunct	  can	  
be	  deleted	  from	  the	  definition	  without	  sacrificing	  completeness.	  	  
Snowdon	  offers	  us	  an	  interesting	  example	  (which	  he	  takes	  from	  J.	  N.	  Hinton)	  to	  
make	  his	  point.	  	  I	  am	  sitting	  in	  a	  darkened	  room	  and	  I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  very	  brief	  faint	  flash	  
of	  light.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  This	  wording	  is	  a	  composite	  assembled	  from	  Snowdon	  (1981),	  184-­‐185.	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Consider,	  first,	  a	  case	  in	  which:	  
	  a.	  There	  is	  really	  a	  light	  that	  I	  see.	  	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  there	  really	   is	  something	  that	   looks	  to	  me	  as	   if	   it	   is	  a	  flash	  of	   light.	   	   It	  has	  
egocentric	   location,	  moreover,	   and	   I	   can	   demonstratively	   identify	   it.	   	   So,	   DIS	   (above)	  
works:	  	  the	  first	  disjunct	  is	  satisfied.	  	  	  
Now	  consider	  a	  different	  case.	  	  Suppose	  that:	  
b.	  My	  visual	  presentation	   is	  as	  of	   a	   light;	   i.e.,	   it	   is	   to	  me	  as	   if	   there	   is	  a	  
light.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  light	  there	  –	  it	  is	  an	  after-­‐image.	  	  	  	  	  
Theorists	  opposed	  to	  disjunctivism	  think	  that	  in	  b,	  my	  visual	  state	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  
in	  a	  where	  what	  I	  see	  is	  really	  was	  a	  flash	  of	  light.	  	  So,	  they	  say,	  this	  too	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  
I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  flash	  of	  light.	  	  And	  in	  this	  case,	  too,	  these	  non-­‐disjunctivists	  say,	  there	  is	  
something	  that	  looks	  to	  me	  like	  a	  flash	  of	  light	  –	  namely,	  the	  after-­‐image.	  Thus,	  the	  non-­‐
disjunctivists	  argue,	   the	   first	  disjunct	   is	   the	  best	   theory	  of	  both	  cases,	  and	   there	   is	  no	  
reason	  for	  the	  second	  disjunct	  to	  be	  added	  in.	  	  	  
Snowdon	   disagrees	   with	   this.	   	   One	   simple	   way	   of	   arguing	   the	   point	   (not	  
Snowdon’s,	  but	  he	  would	  agree	  with	  the	  premises)	  is	  this.	  	  It	  is	  not	  possible,	  as	  I	  argued	  
in	   the	   preceding	   section,	   demonstratively	   to	   identify	   an	   after-­‐image.	   	   In	   case	   b.,	  
therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  of	  demonstrating	  the	  object	  that	  looks	  to	  me	  as	  if	  it	  is	  a	  
flash	  of	  light.	  	  	  Thus,	  Snowdon	  argues,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  same	  experience	  as	  in	  case	  a,	  which	  
does	  support	  demonstrative	  identification.	  	  This	  is	  his	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  there	  are	  
two	  quite	  different	  states	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  ‘I	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  flash	  of	  light’	  is	  true	  –	  one	  
kind	  supports	  egocentric	  location	  and	  the	  other	  does	  not.	  	  Snowdon	  says:	  
The	   disjunctive	   picture	   divides	   what	   makes	   looks	   ascriptions	   true	   into	   two	   classes.	   	   In	  
cases	   where	   there	   is	   no	   sighting	   they	   are	   made	   true	   by	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   intrinsically	  
independent	  of	  surrounding	  objects;	  but	  in	  cases	  of	  sighting	  the	  truth-­‐conferring	  state	  of	  
affairs	  involves	  the	  surrounding	  objects.	  	  (1981,	  186)	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Looks-­‐judgements	   are	  made	   true	  by	   two	   types	  of	  occurrence:	   in	  hallucinations	   they	  are	  
made	   true	   by	   some	   feature	   of	   a	   (non-­‐object-­‐involving)	   inner	   experience,	   whereas	   in	  
perceptions	  they	  are	  made	  true	  by	  some	  feature	  of	  a	  certain	  relation	  to	  an	  object,	  a	  non-­‐
inner	  experience,	  (which	  does	  not	  involve	  such	  an	  inner	  experience).	  (1990,	  130)	  
I	  agree	  with	  Snowdon	  about	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  of	  this	  case.	   	  But	   it	  seems	  to	  
me	   that	   he	   is	   wrong	   about	   case	   b.	   	   Translating	   it	   into	   my	   terms,	   I	   would	   say	   if	   the	  
experience	  in	  case	  b	  is	  genuinely	  as	  of	  a	  light	  –	  if	  it	  genuinely	  is	  to	  me	  that	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  
flash	  of	  light	  –	  then	  it	  should	  seem	  to	  me	  as	  if	  the	  light	  is	  in	  a	  certain	  position	  relative	  to	  
me.	   	   In	  my	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	   this	  matter,	   it	   is	  characteristic	  of	   seeming	  to	  see	  an	  
object	   that	   that	  object	   is	  endowed	  with	  egocentric,	  not	  merely	  phenomenal,	   location.	  
Consequently,	  my	  visual	  state	  in	  b.	  will	  seem	  to	  support	  pointing,	  moving	  towards,	  etc.	  –	  
though	  in	  fact	  it	  does	  not	  support	  pointing,	  moving	  towards,	  etc.	  	  Thus,	  my	  visual	  state	  
does	  support	  a	  demonstrative	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  assigns	  egocentric	  location	  to	  the	  flash	  of	  light	  
–	   but	   because	   my	   visual	   state	   is	   inaccurate,	   the	   demonstrative	   that	   it	   supports	   is	  
vacuous,	  and	  does	  not	  single	  anything	  out.	  
It	  is	  instructive,	  here,	  to	  consider	  two	  further	  cases:	  
c.	  My	   visual	   presentation	   is	  as	   of	   an	   after-­‐image;	   it	   is	   to	  me	   as	   if	   I	   am	  
suffering	  an	  after-­‐image.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  suffering	  an	  after	  image;	  it	  is	  
a	  real	  light	  that	  I	  see.	  
Here,	   it	  seems	  to	  me,	  my	  visual	  state	  fails	  to	  assign	  egocentric	   location	  coordinates	  to	  
the	  thing	  that	  I	  see.	  	  If	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  as	  if	  it	  is	  an	  after-­‐image,	  then	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  as	  if	  
it	   isn’t	   a	   real	   thing	   in	   the	   external	   world,	   and	   hence	   it	   is	   not	   sensed	   as	   having	   real	  
location	  relative	  to	  me,	  only	  phenomenal	  location.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  experientially	  like:	  
d.	   	  My	  visual	  presentation	   is	  as	  of	  an	  after-­‐image;	   it	   is	   to	  me	  as	   if	   I	   am	  
suffering	  an	  after-­‐image.	  	  And	  I	  am	  indeed	  suffering	  an	  after-­‐image.	  
Snowdon	  maintains	  (1981,	  190)	  that	  “a	  person	  seeing	  a	   light	  but	  believing	  that	  
he	  is	  having	  an	  after-­‐image	  may	  be	  allowed	  to	  make	  a	  demonstrative	  judgement	  to	  the	  
effect	   that	   that	   is	  an	  after-­‐image”	   (my	  emphasis).	   	   I	   take	   it	   that	  he	  means	   that	  case	  c	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supports	  a	  demonstrative.	  	  Thus,	  Snowdon	  thinks	  that	  in	  case	  c	  that	  I	  will	  have	  judged	  of	  
the	   light	   that	   it	   is	  an	  after-­‐image.	   	  This	   is	  where	   I	  disagree:	  phenomenal	   location	  does	  
not	  even	  seem	  to	  support	  demonstrative	  identification.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  make	  
a	  judgement	  about	  the	  light.	  	  	  
Here,	   then,	   is	   the	  difference	  between	  Snowdon’s	  position	  and	  mine.	   	  Snowdon	  
thinks	   that	   demonstrative	   thought	   is	   impossible	   without	   something	   that	   is	  
demonstrated.	  	  Thus,	  he	  thinks	  that	  the	  condition	  under	  a	  visual	  state	  is	  demonstrative	  
is	  an	  external	  condition	  –	  i.e.,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  light	  there.	  	  I	  think	  that	  a	  visual	  state	  is	  
demonstrative	  is	  demonstrative	  if	  it	  assigns	  egocentric	  coordinates	  to	  a	  thing.	  	  This	  is	  an	  
internal	   condition.	   	   On	   my	   way	   of	   thinking,	   demonstrative	   thought	   is	   vacuous	   when	  
something	  seems	  to	  possess	  egocentric	  location,	  but	  does	  not.	  	  Further,	  Snowdon	  thinks	  
that	  after-­‐images	  appear	  to	  have	  egocentric	  location,	  and	  that	  demonstration	  is	  not	  only	  
possible	   but	   successful	   when	   there	   is	   something	   at	   the	   egocentric	   location	   that	   the	  
after-­‐image	  appears	  to	  have.	  	  I	  believe,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  that	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  seem	  
to	  see	  an	  after-­‐image	  is	  to	  seem	  to	  see	  something	  that	  has	  no	  egocentric	  location.	  	  	  	  
In	  my	  view,	   it	   is	   that	   a	   and	  b	  present	   things	  as	  possessing	  egocentric	   location,	  
while	   c	   and	   d	   do	   not.	   	   This	   view	   is	   different	   from	   the	   one	   that	   Snowdon	   is	   most	  
concerned	  to	  oppose.	  	  His	  main	  target	  is	  the	  view	  is	  that	  there	  is	  some	  core	  experience	  
that	  is	  in	  common	  to	  all	  four	  cases.	  	  I	  join	  him	  in	  rejecting	  that	  view.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
I	  reject	  the	  position	  that,	  as	  Snowdon	  puts	  it,	  “it	  is	  quite	  possible	  for	  elements	  (objects,	  
or	   states	  of	  affairs)	  external	   to	   the	   subject	   to	  be	   ingredients	  of	  an	  experience”	   (1990,	  
124).	  	  This	  leads	  him	  to	  the	  view	  that	  a	  and	  c	  are	  genuine	  demonstratives,	  and	  b	  and	  d	  
not.	   	  My	  view,	   to	   repeat	   it	  once	  again,	   is	   that	  demonstration	   requires	  only	   something	  
that	  looks	  like	  an	  object	  and	  which	  vision	  endows	  with	  egocentric	  coordinates.	  
IX. Conclusion	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  on-­‐line	  visual	  states	  assign	  seen	  objects	  egocentric	  locations.	  	  It	  is	  by	  
means	  of	   these	   location-­‐assignments	   that	   perceivers	   act	   on	   these	  objects	   quickly	   and	  
accurately.	   	  Egocentric	  location-­‐assignments	  also	  enable	  the	  perceiver	  to	  attend	  to	  the	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objects,	   and	   thus	   to	   form	   beliefs	   about	   them	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   nothing	   other	   than	   the	  
visual	  state	  itself.	  	  Off-­‐line	  visual	  states	  such	  as	  recalling	  and	  imaging	  do	  not	  assign	  seen	  
objects	   egocentric	   locations,	   and	   do	   not	   directly	   support	   physical	   movement	   or	  
information	  gathering	  about	  any	  object.	   	  Moreover,	  subjective	  visual	  phenomena	  such	  
as	   after-­‐images	   are	   also	   not	   assigned	   egocentric	   coordinates.	   	   This	   is	   why	   these	  
phenomena	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  presentations	  of	  real	  external	  objects.	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